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COMMENTS

proof of mere presence at an illegal still as allowing a presumption of possession and control of it, "with all due deference to
the judgment of Congress. 68
Romano would appear to indicate that the mere presence
of a defendant in a car in which a dangerous drug is found cannot by itself be held as presumptive evidence of his knowing possession of the drug. The words "presumptive evidence" should
be construed either to mean "circumstantial evidence,"' requiring the prosecution to produce additional facts besides presence
in order to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
or, at most, to apply only to the owner or driver. Otherwise, the
statute must be considered to be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment's due process of law clause. In any event, these last
decisions of the Supreme Court must be interpreted as having
seriously weakened the validity of section 220.25 of the New
York Penal Law, and it is hoped that this statute will soon be
appropriately challenged.
WILLIAM

M.

FEIGENBAUM

THE UNEMPLOYED HOUSEWIFE-MOTHER: FAIR APPRAISAL OF
ECONOMIC LOSS IN A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION*
I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years our courts and juries have placed what seems in
retrospect to be a small or minimum value on the damages sustained to the next of kin on the death of a housewife and mother.
It is only in the last two decades that our courts have come to
recognize the true value of a housewife and the services she performs.1

Once the courts recognized these services as an ingredient
to be used in determining injuries to the survivor of a decedent
housewife and mother, the amount of recovery for the loss of
68. 382 U.S. at 144.
*The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Aaron J. Broder, Esq., New
York, New York whose work provided the inspiration for the development of this
topic.
1. Horton v. State, 50 Misc. 2d 1017, 1024, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312, 320 (Ct. CL. 1966).
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such services increased.2 Determinations in many jurisdictions
have been aided by the type and extent of expert testimony utilized in formulating this appraisal.3
In an era where women are demanding liberation from
second class status in social, political and economic arenas, the
New York courts have not provided a definitive answer as to
whether expert testimony can be considered in evaluating
damages in a wrongful death action. Nor have sufficient guidelines been provided to be utilized in determining the value of
a "substitute mother-housewife." 4
The purpose of this comment is to consider the rationale
of those cases allowing expert testimony to establish the value of
the services of a housewife-mother. More importantly, the author
intends to illuminate the conflict that exists in New York law
and suggest the pitfalls to be avoided by the Court of Appeals
when and if this matter is considered by that court.
II.

WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES-DAMAGES

Prior to the enactment of Lord Campbell's Act,6 common
law did not provide recovery for the death of a human being
who died as a result of the negligence or wrongful act of another.6 As one ardent critic of the common law position states:

"Compressed into one sentence, at common law death did not
create liability: rather, death extinguished liability."' 7 Most sta-

2. Id. at 321.
3. See text accompanying note 20 infra.
4. See text accompanying note 16 infra.
5. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
6. See Baker v. Bolton, 1 Comp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) holding that the
infliction of death was not a tort against either the survivor or the decedent; cf.
Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) which appeared to refute the
common law rule expounded in Baker, supra. But see Green v. Hudson R.R., 28 Barb.
9, 16 How. Pr. 230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858), aft'd, 41 N.Y. (2 Keyes) 294 (1866), which
dismissed the holding in Ford, supra as mere dicta. For the common law rule in New
York, see Kelliher v. New York C. & H.R.R., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824 (1914);
Sharrow v. Inland Lines, 214 N.Y. 101, 108 N.E. 217 (1915).
7. Lambert, History and Future, in WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURvivoR.sHip 3 (NACCA
6th Circuit Seminar Beall ed. 1957). See Morange v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375 (1970) for further criticism of the Baker rule.
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tutory responses,' enacted to fill this gap left by the common law,
are modeled after the provisions set forth in Lord Campbell's
Act9 and generally use the following scheme:
The personal representative, duly appointed in this state or any
other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees
may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act,
neglect or default which caused the decedent's death against a
person who would have been liable to the decedent by reason

of such wrongful conduct if death had not ensued. 10
While wrongful death statutes authorize the institution of an
action only where the party killed would have been able to sue
had death not ensued, it is important to understand that the awarding of damages must be based on injuries to the survivor and
not to the decedent."
8. For an excellent discussion of the historical development of wrongful death
statutes, see Lambert, History and Future, in WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP
3-37 (NACCA 6th Circuit Seminar Beall ed. 1957). See S. SPEISER, REcOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH app. A at 778-904 for the text of the individual state wrongful death
and survival statutes. See also Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton,
32 L.Q. REv. 431 (1916); Malone, Genesis of Wrongful Death 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043
(1965).
9. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
10. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967)
(emphasis
added) which can be considered a pure death act and not amalgamated with survival
features. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 277 App. Div. 625, 102 N.Y.S.2d 65
(3d Dep't 1951), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d 882 (1951), interpreting the New
York statute to create a right of action unknown to the common law. For an analysis of
New York Law, see 7B 0. WARREN, NEGLIGENCE IN THE NEW YORK COURTS § 1-10.03
[2]. For an informative discussion of the history, purpose and application of the New
York wrongful death statute, see Holmes v. City of New York, 269 App. Div. 95,
54 N.Y.S. 289 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 615, 65 N.E.2d 449 (1945).
Wrongful death statutes in the following states all incorporate and base recovery
on the commission of a wrongful act, neglect, or default. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12-611 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-906 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-2 (1964);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1970); HAwAII Rv. LAws § 663-3 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 70, § 1 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2551 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art.
67, § 1 (1957); MIcH. COMP. LAws § 600.2922 (1968); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.080 (1952);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-809 (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 12.090 (1968) (excludes default);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:31-1 (1951); N.Y. EST., POwERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney
1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ch. 2125.01 (Baldwin 1964); R.1; GEN. LAws ANN. § 10-7-1 (1969); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (1962); S.D. ComPsLD LAws ANN. § 21-5-1 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14 § 1492 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.20.010
(1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-5 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.03 (1958); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1065 (1957).
11. It was suggested by some courts and commentators that the prohibition
of nonstatutory wrongful death actions derived support from the ancient common-law rule that a personal cause of action in tort did not survive the death
of its possessors . . . and the decision in Baker v. Bolton itself may have been
influenced by this principle ....
However, it is now, universally recognized that
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A majority of jurisdictions have incorporated language
in their statutes requiring that all damages be defined in terms
of a pecuniary loss to the decedent's survivor.12 Initially this was
intended to be a limitation on recovery. However, this statutory
language has been construed broadly and extended beyond mere
contribution of food, shelter, money or property, and damages
have been awarded to survivors for loss of society, care and attention. 13 Regardless of the interpretation of the statute, the
courts consider the following elements in assessing damages for
the wrongful death of an employed individual: age of the decedent, his health, habits, qualities, income, and the number, age,
sex, situation and condition of those dependent upon him or
because this principle pertains only to the victim's own personal claims, such as
for pain and suffering, it has no bearing on the question whether a dependent

should be permitted to recover for the injury he suffers from the victim's
death ....
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 898 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
For a discussion of New York law relating to this issue, see Chartener v. Kice,
270 F. Supp. 432, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1967): "under both New York and California law,
a cause of action for wrongful death is an original and distinct cause of action which
accrues at the time of death and inures to the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries."
See also Greco v. Kresge, 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938), stating that actions to
recover for personal injuries abate with the death of the injured person, but that the
New York statute creates a new cause of action based not upon damage to the estate of
the deceased, but rather for pecuniary injury to the surviving spouse and next of kin.
12. See e.g., N.Y. EST., PowEns & TRUSTS LAw § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967) which
provides as follows:
The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury or, where
issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee deems to be fair and
just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death
to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought. . .. (emphasis added)
This standard is contrasted with those statutes under which damages for a wrongful
death action are measured by the amount of loss to the estate. See generally S. SPEISER,
REcOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 3:1 &83:2 (1966) for a comparison of these two
standards.
13. See22AM.JuR. 2dDeath § 123 (1965):
The word 'pecuniary,' as used in death statutes, has been said not to be in a
sense of the immediate loss of money or property but to look to the prospective

advantages of a pecuniary nature that have been cut off by the premature death

of the person from whom they would have come.
See also Page, Damages for Wrongful Death-Broadening View of Pecuniary Loss, in
DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 383 (Schreiber ed. 1965);
Robins, The Broadening Concept of "Pecuniary Loss" in Wrongful Death Statutes,
PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 563 (1961); H. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Aar § 154 (2d
ed. 1913), indicating that wrongful death statutes should be construed broadly in light
of their objectives and should not be restricted to items estimated in terms of money.
See generally Hare, The Rationale of Damages for the Death of a Minor or Dependent
Person, 41 B.U.L. REv. 336 (1961).
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her for support. 14 Survivors of an employed female (wife-mother)
are not disadvantaged in the evaluation of injuries because of a
wrongful death. This results from the fact that there is no distinction made in the procedure utilized in evaluating lost earnings for an employed male or female. 15
III.

SUBSTITUTE

MOTHER-HOUSEWIFE

CONCEPT

Economic indicators and guidelines are readily available
in assessing the worth of an employed female.-' A distinct problem develops, however, in attempting to make a similar assessment for an unemployed female. Until recently, courts did not
consider the substitute services of a mother-housewife as an
element to be utilized in assessing the damages in an action for
wrongful death instituted by the decedent's children or husband.' 7
It has been noted that:
In computing the damages of a husband for the death of his wife
the recovery should not be limited to the recovery of a menial
servant. Neither should the recovery be limited to what the wife
would have earned working for another, nor to a combination
thereof. Rather, would these be included along with the value of
her services in counseling, advising, inspiring, confronting, and
otherwise serving her -husband as would have reasonably been expected from a wife who was the kind of person she is shown to
have been.' 8
14. E.g. St. George v. State, 203 Misc. 40, 118 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1953);
Sutherland v. State, 189 Misc. 953, 63 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. CI. 1947); In re Mangan, 162
Misc. 495, 294 N.Y.S. 974 (Sur. Ct. 1937); Weathers v. New York C. R.R., 120 Misc.
830, 199 N.Y.S. 875 (Sup. Ct. 1923). See also Moore-McCormack Lines v. Richardson,
295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); indicating the importance of evidence as to parental
qualities. For the principles to be taken into consideration in appraising basic and
potential earnings, see S. SPEISER, REcoVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-ECONOMIC HANDBOOK
§ 1:2 (1970), which utilizes general economic and statistical principles in appraising
gross and net loss earnings.
15. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-ECONOMtIC HANDBOOK § 12:1
(1970).
16. d. at H9 5:1-10:1.
17. See Fraiser v. Public Service Interstate Transp., 244 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1957);
Merrill v. United Air Lines, 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Williams v. McDowell,
32 Cal. App. 2d 49, 89 P.2d 155 (1939); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburg Motor
Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
18. S. SPEISER, REcovERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 4:3 n.20 (1966), citing Continental Bus System v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See also Merrill v.
United Air Lines, 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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There are several methods available to attorneys that may be

used to prove the value of services of a housewife-mother:
proof by presumption, actual substitute costs, testimony of
friends and family, and expert testimony. 19 It is apparent that
the ability to equate an economic indicator to the type of service
performed will provide a more accurate appraisal of the damages
involved. Thus, in order to achieve a realistic appraisal of these
services, the method chosen by the attorney and allowed by the
court becomes important. While proof of damages by presumption, actual substitute costs, or testimony of family and friends
can be useful methods to evaluate the loss of services, they do
not provide an accurate standard by which damages may be assessed.20 However, expert testimony, if admitted by the courts, can
be used to exhibit the current economic value of a substitute
housewife-mother and would be the most accurate appraisal of
the losses involved.
Most foreign jurisdictions that have considered the issue of

allowing expert testimony have concluded that it is properly admissible. 21 Those jurisdictions which have not directly confronted the admissibility question have not held it error to admit
22
such testimony.
19. For an excellent discussion and analysis of the various methods, see Comment,
Torts-Wrongful Death---"How Much is a Good Wife Worth?," 33 Mo. L. REV. 463,
466-70 (1968).
20. Id. at 466-68.
21. Har-Pen Truck Lines v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967); State v.
Phillips, 470 P.2d 266 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1970); Smith v. Whidden, 87 So. 2d 42 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1956); Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, 170 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1969). Com.
pare Thomas v. S.H. Pawley Lumber, 303 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1962); Dobsen v. Richter,
34 Ill. App. 2d 22, 180 N.E.2d 505 (1962), which represents the majority position that
the value of damages resulting from the wrongful death of a housewife-mother are
within the common knowledge of the jury. They do not, however, indicate that expert
testimony will not be admissible as to the value of such services. For an appraisal of
case law in this area and an extensive case history, see Comment, supra note 18, at 466.
See generally Keirr, Damages Arising from the Death of a Housewife, in NACCA 14T1
ANNUAL CONVENTION TRANsci1r 645 (1961); Lambert, Comments on Recent Important
Personal Injury (Tort Cases), 26-27 NACCA L.J. 45-55 (Nov. 1960 & May 1961);
Lambert & Rheingold, Comments on Recent Important PersonalInjury (Tort Cases),
28 NACCA L.J. 63, 72-73 (Nov. 1961 & May 1962).
22. Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961); Lithgrow v.
Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954). For a New York case on this point, see
Weiss v. Rubin, 11 App. Div. 2d 818, 205 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d
230, 173 N.E.2d 791, 213 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960). See also Lassiter, Estimating the Monetary
Value of Damages in Negligence Cases Involving Deabh, in DAMAGES IN PERSONAL
INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH 457, 462 (Schreiber ed. 1965).
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In admitting expert testimony on the value of substitute
services, the court in Merrill v. United Air Lines23 clearly
stated its rationale for doing so.
To provide orphan children with the best available substitute
for a mother one intelligent course would be to obtain the services
of a professional worker trained in the field of home economics.
This is a recognized branch of applied economics and sociology ....
As knowledge becomes more professionalized, specialists will
more frequently be called upon as expert witnesses. This is a judicial by-product of our age of pervasive technology and expanding
social services.
By allowing expert testimony to be admitted, the court did not
preclude the jury from assessing the weight that should be given
to such testimony. Nor did the decision prevent the jury from

using "[plopular knowledge and common sense"24 in their assessment of the value of the services.
New York case law on the admissibility of expert testimony in wrongful death actions with respect to the estimation
of damages is at this time unsettled. It is apparent from an anal-

ysis of the cases in this area that an attorney seeking to establish
the value of services performed by a housewife-mother is at a disadvantage because of the insufficiency of judicial guidelines.
A comparison of two New York cases, Zaninovich v. American Airlines 5 and Horton v. State,26 indicates the conflict that

exists. The Zaninovich case was a wrongful death action instituted by the executors of the estates of a 29 year old father and
28 year old mother on behalf of four surviving children. The
supreme court, special term, permitting expert testimony on
the valuation of damages, awarded $550,000 in damages for
the wrongful death of the father and $200,000 for the wrongful
death of the mother.27 The appellate division held that such
an award was grossly excessive because the jury was influenced
by the "poignant sympathy inducing factors. '

28

Further, the

23. 177 F. Supp. 704, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afJ'd, 288 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1961).
24. Id. at 705.
25. 47 Misc. 2d 584, 262 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 26 App. Div. 2d 155,
271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dep't 1966).
26. 50 Misc. 2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ct. C1. 1966).
27. 47 Misc. 2d at 586, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
28. 26 App. Div. at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
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court pointed out that unless the plaintiff executors stipulated
to a reduced award of $350,000 for the death of the father and
5125,000 for the death of the mother, the court would reverse
the lower court and remand for a new trial. 29 On the issue of admissibility of expert testimony, the court held that
it was error to allow proof as to costs in providing a substitute
for the wife. These are matters within the common ken, and subject to so many variables and choices that no objective standard
can be supplied by an expert, if one .there be ....
30
Horton was based on a wrongful death action instituted by
the dependents of a decedent housewife-mother. The Court of
Claims of New York awarded $60,000 in damages. In assessing
the amount of damages the court noted that:
A comparatively recent trend in an action for wrongful death of a
woman survived by children is the assessment of damages under
the so-called substitute wife-mother theory. There are several cases
which allow the expert testimony by one qualified in the field of
domestic service agencies and hold it is competent evidence of
damages for the wrongful death of a housewife. Weiss v. Rubin,
11 A.D. 2d 818; [205 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3d Dep't 1960)]; Zaninovich v.
American Airlines, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 584, 262 N.Y.S.2d 854 ....31

In considering the expert testimony presented, the court concluded that "weight should be given to this testimony in the assessment of damages as to do otherwise would deprive a Claimant
of his just damages . *..."32
In analyzing the two cases, it is initially important to note
that the court in Horton cited the lower court decision in
Zaninovich as standing for the proposition that expert testimony
should be allowed as to the value of substitute services.83
Subsequent to the decision in Horton, the Appellate Division,
First Department, modified the lower court decision in
Zaninovich and held that it was error to admit such testimony. 34
29. Id. at 162-63, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 872-74.
30. Id. at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (emphasis added). See the case comparison,
supra note 21. It would appear, therefore, that Zaninovich is in definite conflict with
those jurisdictions similarly holding that it is within the common knowledge of the jury
to appraise the value of the loss of services of a housewife-mother. Contrary to other

jurisdictions, Zaninovich specifically excludes expert testimony on this issue.
31.
32.

50 Misc. 2d at 1022, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 319 (emphasis added).
Id.

33.

Id.

34. 26 App. Div. 2d at 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
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Further, the court in Horton cited Weiss v. Rubin33 which
antedated Zaninovich by five years. In Weiss, at the trial stage,
the plaintiff introduced testimony through an expert of the New
York Family Service Society as to the value of the main services
performed by a housewife during the normal course of her daily
activities. The cost of hiring a substitute mother was fully set
forth in the record. Neither the Appellate Division, Second Department,3 nor the Court of Appeals 3 7 commented upon the evidence adduced at the time of the trial. More importantly, however, the court in Zaninovich completely ignored the Weiss decision. There is no rational basis for the court in Zaninovich not
to comment on or distinguish the implications that can be drawn
from Weiss.
The primary reasoning of the court in Zaninovich for excluding proof as to the cost of providing a substitute housewife-mother is that these matters are within the "common ken" of
the jury, and are subject to so many variables and choices that
no objective standard can be supplied by an expert. 3 While it
is required under our pecuniary loss standard to demonstrate the
monetary equivalent of the decedent's character, her propensities to help her children and family, her ability and capability,
and all aspects of her conduct, 89 it would appear that the
Zaninovich court would not allow expert proof as to these services.
In order to reach this conclusion, the court, citing Clark
v. Iceland S.S. Co.,40 relied on the proposition that only where

the subject of inquiry is of such technical nature that a-proper
conclusion from the facts depends upon professional or scientific skill, may qualified experts express their opinion as to the
proper inference to be drawn from a given set of facts.4 '
The cases cited in Clark as not permitting expert testimony
concern factual situations where such testimony would be unnecessary to convey the facts to the jury or to enable -them to
35. 11 App. Div. 2d 818, 205 N.Y.S.2d 274 (3d Dep't), af'd, 9 N.Y.2d 230, 173
N.E.2d 791, 213 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1960).
36. Id.
37. 9 N.Y.2d 230, 173 N.E.2d 791, 213 N.Y.S2d 65 (1960).
38. 26 App. Div. 2d at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. 6 App. Div. 2d 544, 179 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Ist Dep't 1958).
41. 26 App. Div. 2d at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871; see J. PRINCE, RICHAWUSON ON
EVIDENCE § 387 (9th ed. 1964).
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arrive at a determination.42 Whereas, those cases holding that
expert testimony is admissible consider factors which are peculiarly within the knowledge of men whose experience and study
enable them to speak with'authority on the subject.431 It has
been suggested that admitting expert testimony as to the value
of the substitute services of a housewife-mother invades the functions of the jury and is within their "common ken. '44 It has
been concluded, however, that "[s]uch modern scientific testimony is more reliable than the jury's unbound musings of yes' 45
teryears.
Not only does the court in Zaninovich contend that allowing expert testimony would invade the "common ken," but also
that there are too many variables and choices involved to devise
an objective standard. 46 A complete discussion of this problem
is presented by Stuart Speiser in his book Recovery for Wrongful
Death-Economic Handbook. The author lists nine roles performed by the housewife-mother and their corresponding occupational equivalent and suggests that these should be utilized in
appraising damages in a wrongful death action. 47 While it is
suggested that there is overlapping among these categories and
that their individual worth is very difficult to determine, 48 the
author concludes that this approach is better than relying on
the jury's common knowledge. Recognizing the problems with
this piecemeal approach, Speiser also presents a more practical
42. 6 App. Div. 2d at 54748, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 712-13.
43. Id.
44. 26 App. Div. 2d at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871. See also Har-Pen Truck Lines v.
Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
45. Har-Pen Truck Lines v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1967). See
generally the discussion of this case in 10 PERSONAL INJURY NEWSLETTER 85-87 (1967).
46. 26 App. Div. 2d at 159, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
47.

ROLES OF WIFE AND MOTHER AND THEIR OCCUPATIONAL EQUIVALENTS

Roles assumed by a wife and mother
House keeper
Nurse
Counsellor
Money manager
Family chauffeur
Mrs. "Fixit"
Cook
Dishwasher
Clothes-washer

Similar occupations
Household Worker, Domestic
Registered Nurse, Practical Nurse
Teacher, Psychotherapist
Bookkeeper, Accountant, Home economist
Chauffeur, Taxi Driver
Carpenter, Plumber, Electrician
Cook, Chef, Dietician
Dishwasher
Laundress, Laundry Worker

S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATu-EcoNoMic

48.

Id. at § 12:4.

HANDBOOK § 12:3 (1970).
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method based on the roles of a housewife-mother as an "Experienced Female Private Household Worker" and an "Elementary
School Teacher. ' 49 The role or roles applied in the evaluation
of lost services are readily adapted to individual situations. It
is a "relatively simple and direct approach to the measurement
of the lost wife, or wife and mother" and "[t]he trier of fact can
understand, follow and apply it."' O These occupational equivalents provide a base from which an attorney can develop expert
testimony"- and guideposts that can be utilized to assist the jury
in formulating fair and just compensation for injuries received
by those individuals dependent on a housewife-mother. Further,
courts that have held that expert testimony is admissible generally
have allowed testimony on the above occupations. 2
IV.

CONCLUSION

We must not delude ourselves into believing that the values
of yesteryear can in every instance satisfy contemporary needs.
While at one time the services of women were valued indifferently,
in contemporary times our society has abandoned the attitude
of second class status for women. Thus, both because of the
reality of our times, and the pecuniary loss standard involved, it
can no longer be countenanced that the life of a woman should
be valued under the guidelines set forth in Zaninovich. Valued
accordingly, mathematical calculations would yield the peculiar
result that a woman's life could possibly be worth one-third
that of her husband, simply because she did not have a weekly
paycheck.53 The anomalous result which has been obtained in
Zaninovich finds no basis either in morality or law.
Viewed in this light, the reasoning of the court in
Zaninovich cannot withstand a comparison with the piecemeal
or practical approach promulgated by Speiser. The rationale in
Horton corresponds more closely to these approaches and the
mandate of the New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law sec49. Id. See also Comment, supra note 18.
50. Id.
51. For the type of testimony that has been entered in such actions, see S.
SPEisER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH-ECONOMIC HANDBOOK § 14:5 (1970).
52. See cases cited supra note 20.
53. See the damage figures awarded by the court in Zaninovich where the father's
life was valued at $350,000 and the mother's at $125,000.
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tion 5-4.3 which requires the awarding of "fair and just compensation for pecuniary losses."
Of course, it is within the "common ken" to know and
understand the nature of services performed by a housewife-mother, but it is not within the "common ken" to know what it would
cost to seek replacement services. Do twelve people chosen from
a cross-section of the community necessarily know the cost of
a nurse-governess, a housekeeper, a babysitter, counselling and
psychological guidances and related items? This determination
is peculiarly within the knowledge of an employment specialist
who can more accurately appraise occupational equivalents. If
it is proven that the mother performed these services and if an
action for wrongful death is based on the awarding of "fair and
just compensation for the pecuniary injuries," then why should a
jury not be informed of the cost of replacing these services which
were denied the survivors by the wrongful act of another?
The confusion and unsettled nature of the law will continue to exist until the Court of Appeals speaks on this issue. If
the Court of Appeals follows the current trend and rules according to the decisions in Weiss, Horton and Merrill, this discussion
will be academic.
THOMAS F. SEGALLA

